Abstract-Privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocols are an important building block for secure computation tasks in various applications. Lu et al. (TPDS'13) introduced a PPSP protocol that does not rely on cryptographic assumptions and that is used in a wide range of publications to date. In this comment paper, we show that Lu et al.'s protocol is insecure and should not be used. We describe specific attacks against it and, using impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89), show that it is inherently insecure and cannot be fixed without employing public-key cryptography.
INTRODUCTION
T HE SCALAR product is a fundamental operation in linear algebra that is used in a variety of fields, e.g., serving as the basis of deep neural networks, biometric characterization, or computer graphics. Suppose two parties P 0 and P 1 with respective input vectors a and b want to interactively compute the scalar product a · b = n i=1 a i b i such that P 0 obtains the result a · b without revealing anything else about b to P 0 or anything about a to P 1 . This secure computation of the scalar product is an important building block for preserving privacy in many applications. In 2013, Lu et al. [1] proposed a privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocol in their paper titled "SPOC: A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Opportunistic Computing Framework for Mobile-Healthcare Emergency". This protocol relies on "multi-party random masking and polynomial aggregation techniques" [2] , where no public-key cryptography is used. In [2] , it has been shown that the protocol is much faster than public-key based protocols using homomorphic encryption. Since then, this protocol has been and is still used in many privacy-preserving solutions [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , including support vector machines [17] , facial expression classification [9] , medical pre-diagnosis [18] , and speaker verification [10] , [11] .
In this comment paper, we present attacks against the original [1] 
LU ET AL.'S PROTOCOL CANNOT BE SECURE
Formally, the secure computation of a function f (a, b) on input a from P 0 and input b from P 1 by a protocol Π is defined as follows by observing the ideal execution of f and the real execution of Π [21, chapter 7] :
where c ≈ denotes computational indistinguishability. The ideal execution only yields the result f (a, b) while the real execution also contains the view of the execution of Π. In order to break the privacy of a protocol, it suffices to show that one party can distinguish between different inputs of the other party based on the observed execution of Π. This is a standard notion of security in cryptography and protocols where this distinction is possible are considered insecure. Conversely, in order to ensure the security of a protocol, a security proof of indistinguishability is needed [22] .
The secure computation of any non-trivial functionality can be reduced to the secure computation of a primitive called oblivious transfer (OT) [23] . In OT, a party P 0 inputs a choice bit b and P 1 inputs two bits (x 0 , x 1 ). P 0 receives x b as output without learning any information about x 1−b and without revealing any information about b to P 1 . Impagliazzo and Rudich [24] proved that a black-box reduction of OT to one way functions would imply P = N P . This means that OT likely requires complexity-theoretic assumptions of public-key cryptography, as otherwise a proof of P = N P would be found. Clearly, the existence of a PPSP protocol would imply OT, as OT is just a special case of PPSP where a = (b, b) and b = (x 0 , x 1 ). It follows that a PPSP protocol has to rely on public-key cryptography and that those that do not (such as Lu et al.'s protocol) must be flawed. Known and secure PPSP protocols rely on general-purpose secure two-party computation based on homomorphic encryption or OT [25] .
LU ET AL.'S PROTOCOL IS NOT SECURE
Lu et al.'s PPSP protocol first appeared in [1] as a subprotocol in a privacy-preserving healthcare framework and
Step 1: (performed by P0) Given security parameters k1, k2, k3, k4 choose a k1-bit prime p and a k2-bit prime α. Add an+1 = an+2 = 0. Choose random s ∈ Zp and random k3-bit c1, . . . , cn+2.
Then, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n + 2} let Ci = s·ci mod p ai = 0 s·(α · ai + ci) mod p ai = 0 send α, p, C1, . . . , Cn+2
Step 2: (performed by P1) Add bn+1 = bn+2 = 0 and choose random k4-bit r1, . . . , rn+2.
Step 3: (performed by P0) Compute E = s −1 ·D mod p. Then, was later extended in [2] by introducing fixes to preserve privacy. The protocol is shown in Figure 1 , with the extensions of [2] underlined. Before presenting our specific attacks, we briefly outline how the protocol works. However, we again want to stress that even though these specific attacks may be fixable, a PPSP protocol is highly unlikely to be secure without using public-key cryptography (cf. §2).
Correctness stems from a trick: Thus,
Depending on these inequalities and on q and n, the values of k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and k 4 are chosen as k 1 = 512, k 2 = 200, and k 3 = k 4 = 128 to ensure correctness. Similar assumptions can be found in the original protocol [1] .
One can immediately see why the original protocol of [1] 
Since D is completely deterministic and depends only on α, C i , and b, party P 0 can easily distinguish different values of b because it knows α and all C i . For instance, for b = 0, P 1 will return n i=1 C i whereas for b = (1, 0, . . . , 0), P 1 will return α · C 1 + n i=2 C i . This attack works for any value of a. This vulnerability was fixed in [2] by introducing random addends to D via b n+1 = b n+2 = 0. Operations based on public-key cryptography still do not appear in the protocol. Thus, the security of this version is implausible as well (cf. §2). Indeed, we found another attack that can distinguish different b. We consider this attack for the case of a = 0, because then the output of the ideal functionality is equal to 0 and yields no knowledge about b. Still, using the following strategy, P 0 can distinguish between b = 0 and b ′ = (1, 0, . . . , 0) after computing E in step 3:
Our attack works because it essentially abuses the trick applied for correctness to check whether one factor of α
An issue here is that α · E < α 2 does not hold. However, the overflow of α · E is relatively minor: |α · r i c i | − |α 2 | = k 3 + k 4 − k 2 = 56 bit. Thus, for b, C ′ will be a k 3 + k 4 − k 2 = 56-bit integer, while C ′ will be equal to c 1 for the first 2k 2 − (k 3 + k 4 ) = 144 most significant bits in the case of b ′ . The attack can also be extended to distinguish between any kind of b by checking whether C ′ ≈ bi =0 b i c i . As outlined in §2, similar attacks will inadvertently still be possible even if additional randomizations are introduced to prevent this concrete attack as long as no public-key cryptography assumptions are utilized.
In order to show the feasibility of our attack, we implemented it alongside the protocol. Using the parameters of [2] , only a small overflow of α · E mod α 2 is observed in practice and therefore different b can easily be distinguished by P 0 . The implementation is provided as supplementary material to this submission and we will publish it as open source upon acceptance.
CONCLUSION
We showed in §2 that protocols for secure computation of the scalar product imply oblivious transfer. As a result, such protocols very likely require public-key cryptography. Lu et al.'s protocol [1] , [2] is an example in academic use today that does not rely on such assumptions and is thus inherently insecure. Indeed, we found specific attacks that we have verified with an implementation. With this comment paper we want to stress that (at least some) expensive publickey cryptography is necessary for such protocols and that new protocols should be formally proven secure to catch flaws.
